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DRIVING W HILE INTOXICATED OR IMPAIRED
David T. Hashey 0
History
With the advent of the motor vehicle, a new criminal pro­
blem arose: the necessity of dealing with the driver who is un­
able to properly control his actions owing to the influence of 
liquor. For some time no direct action was taken in Canada 
to enable punishment of an intoxicated driver. He might, of 
course, often be liable to prosecution for dangerous driving 
under section 285 of the Criminal Code. But more was required 
to deal with the problem and in 1921 section 285 was amended 
setting up a summary conviction offence with compulsory jail 
sentence tor driving a motor vehicle while intoxicate!.1
The next step was taken in 1925 when a broader prohibition 
was substituted. No longer did the accused need to be actually 
driving; he was equally liable if he was in care or control of the 
motor vehicle. In addition the section now covered being “under 
the influence of narcotics” as well as being intoxicated by alco­
holic beverages.2
In 1930, provision was made so that a charge could now be 
laid upon indictment providing for a heavier penalty which was 
increased by subsequent offences; the penalty on summary con­
viction was not changed. The prosecution thus was given a 
discretion to charge the accused under either. The change em­
phasized the realization of the seriousness of the offence and the 
increasing danger to the public as more and better motor vehicles 
were introduced.
In 1947, a further amendment provided that once the Crown 
had proved that the accused was intoxicated or under the influ­
ence of a narcotic and was occupying the drivers seat, the onus 
was on him to establish "that he aid not enter or mount the said 
vehicle for the purpose of setting it in motion”.4
*1 Law , U.N.B. Mr. Hashey is a Sir Jam es Dunn Scholar in Law.
1. (1921) 11 & 12 Geo. V, c. 25, s. 3, s. 285(c).
2. (1925) 15 & 16 Geo. V, s. 38, s 5. The actual wording of the 
section was not affected by the statutory revision of 1927: 
R.S.C., 1927, s. 36, s. 285(4).
3. (1930) 20 & 21 Geo. V, c. 11, s. 6; added to (1935) 25 & 26
Geo. V, c. 56, s. 4.
4. (1947) 71 Geo. VI, c. 55, s. 10 (now s. 224(2) ).
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In 1951, a new section dealing with the driver who is not 
intoxicated by whose ability to drive is impaired by alcohol or 
a drug was enacted. The offence was less serious as is indicated 
by the penalty imposed upon conviction; a fine could be im­
posed as an alternative to imprisonment if the accused was con­
victed of driving while his ability to do so was impaired.5 At 
the same time, legislation was passed allowing chemical tests of 
bodily substances to be admitted as evidence notwithstanding 
that the accused was not warned that he need not give the 
sample.6 However, it was made clear that no person has to 
submit to that test and the fact that he refuses to give such a 
sample is not admissible.7
The Criminal Code sections as they appear in the new re­
vision8 are as follows:
222. Every one who, while intoxicated or under the 
influence of a narcotic drug, drives a motor vehicle or 
has the care or control of a motor vehicle, whether it is 
in motion or not, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable
(i) for a first offence, to imprisonment for not 
more than three months and not less than 
thirty days, and
(ii) for each subsequent offence, to imprison­
ment for not more than one year and not 
less than three months; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction
and is liable
(i) for a first offence, to imprisonment for not 
more than thirty days and not less than 
seven days,
(ii) for a second offence, to imprisonment for 
not more than three months and not less 
than one month, and
(iii) for each subsequent offence, to imprison­
ment for not more than one year and not 
less than three months.
223. Every one who, while his ability to drive a motor 
vehicle is impaired by alcohol or a drug, drives a motor 
vehicle or has the care or control of a motor vehicle, 
w hether it is in motion or not, is guilty of an indictable 
offence or an offence punishable on summary conviction 
and is liable,
5. (1951) 15 Geo. VI, c. 47, s. 14(2).
6. Ibid. (now s. 224(3)).
7. Ibid. (now s. 224(4)).
8. (1953-4) 2 & 3 Eliz. II, c. 51.
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(a) for a first offence, to a fine of not more than 
five hundred dollars and not less than fifty 
dollars or to imprisonment for three months 
or to both,
(b) for a second offence, to imprisonment for not 
more than three months and not less than  
fourteen days, and
(c) for each subsequent offence, to imprisonment 
for not more than one year and not less than 
three months.
224. (1) Where an accused is charged with an offence 
under section 222, and the evidence does not establish 
that he committed an offence under that section, but 
establishes that he committed an offence under section
223, the accused may be convicted of an offence under 
section 223 and the conviction bars further proceedings 
for any such offence under section 222 or 223.
(2) For the purpose of sections 222 and 223, where a 
person occupies the seat ordinarily occupied by the 
driver of a motor vehicle he shall be deemed to have the 
care or control of the vehicle unless he establishes that 
he did not enter or mount the vehicle for the purpose 
of setting it in motion.
(3) In any proceedings under section 222 or 223, the 
result of a chemical analysis of a sample of the blood 
urine, breath or other bodily substance of a person may 
be admitted in evidence on the issue whether that person 
was intoxicated or under the influence of a narcotic drug 
or whether his ability to drive was impaired by alcohol 
or a drug, notwithstanding that he was not, before he 
gave the sample, warned that he need not give the sample 
or that the results of the analysis of the sample might be 
used in evidence.
(4) No person is required to give a sample of blood, 
urine, breath or other bodily substance for chemical 
analysis for the purposes of this section and evidence 
that a person refused to give such a sample or that such 
a sample was not taken is not admissible nor shall such 
a refusal or the fact that a sample was not taken be the 
subject of comment by any person in the proceedings.
In 1959, three subsections were added to section 224.9 
These are:
(5) In any proceedings under section 222 or section 223 
a certificate purporting to be signed by an analyst stating 
that he has performed a chemicai analysis on the blood, 
urine, breath or other bodily substance of a person and 
stating the results of his analysis or examination is 
prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the certificate 
without proof of the signature or the official character 
of the person by whom it purports to be signed.
9. (1959) 7 & 8 Eliz. II, c. 41, s. 15.
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(6) In this section “analyst” means a person designated 
by the Attorney General as an analyst for the purposes 
of this section
(7) Subsection (5) does not apply in any proceedings 
unless at least seven days’ notice in writing is given to 
the accused that it is intended to tender the certificate  
of the analyst in evidence
Elements
In sections 222 and 223 of the Criminal Code, eight separate 
offences are created. Each of these offences involved four 
separate elements:
(a) The condition of the accused; he must be either intoxi­
cated, under the influence of a narcotic drug, impaired 
by alcohol or impaired by a drug.
(b) The relation of the accused to the motor vehicle; he 
must be either driving or in care or control of it.
(c) Whether the vehicle is a motor vehicle.
(d) Mens rea.
The Crown must take great care in proving the existence 
and close association of all the essential elements. In the case 
of R. v. Brown,10 the accused was charged with driving a motor 
vehicle while intoxicated. The evidence showed that the accused 
was drunk at the time of the arrest and that he had been driving 
a car some time before, but the drunkeness and the driving were 
not brought into juxtaposition and the accused was acquitted.
Each of the elements will now be discussed in greater detail.
Intoxication
The first element to be discussed is “intoxication” as set out 
in section 222 of the Criminal Code. No definition of the word 
has been accepted in all cases and many authorities feel the 
word is less a definition than a test. An explanation that has 
become widely accepted was given by Boyle, J. in McRae v. 
McLaughlin Motor Car.11 He stated:
Intoxication, it must be remembered, is a mental and 
physical condition, caused by the concumption of alcohol 
in some form or another. Some people believe that a 
man who takes any alcohol thereby becomes intoxicated.
10. (1951) 13 C.R. 53
11. [1926] 1 D.L.R. 372, at p. 378; Followed in: R. v. Ouellette 
(1931) 55 C.C.C. 389; R. v. Levesque (1938) 44 Rev. de Ju r. 
309; R. v. Leahy (1939) 73 C.C.C. 99; Gidding* v. R. (1947) 
89 C.C.C. 346; R. ▼. Zasadny (1948) 92 C.C.C. 103.
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In my opinion the degree of intoxication contemplated
by Parliam ent in enacting s. 285(c) (now s. 222) is a state  
of intoxication during which, if permitted to drive a 
motor car, it would be a danger to the public.
Another definition is that given in the New Oxford Dictionary 
which defines intoxication as “the act of stupefying with a drug 
or alcoholic liquor; the making drunk or intoxicated, the condi­
tion of being so stupefied as made drunk”. This definition was 
adopted in R. v. Constable.12 It is clear in any case that intoxi­
cation means more than being under the influence of alcohol. 
Thus it has been held that a charge of having care or control of 
an automobile “while under the influence of liquor” discloses no 
offence under the Criminal Code.13
The control essential for the proper operation of a motor 
vehicle has been described as “the state of mind and a physical 
state that permits driver to operate and drive in a normal, wise 
and prudent manner and to be able to react immediately to the 
difficulties, troubles and problems of traffic”.14 The section is 
aimed at the state of intoxication which deprives the driver of 
this control and renders him a danger both to himself and the 
public. It is, however, not necessary for the Crown to prove 
that the accused was in such a state of intoxication that if per­
mitted to drive he would have been a danger to the public.15
Impairment
There is a point, short of intoxication, where a person’s 
faculties are so interfered with by alcohol that his judgment and 
ability to handle a motor vehicle are impaired.16 The driver in 
this condition is a danger to the public.17 To cope with this 
situation the Criminal Code was amended in 1951 to punish per­
sons whose ability to drive is impaired by alcohol or a drug.18
The mere fact that the accused’s driving was apparently 
normal on the occasion in question is not conclusive of guilt or
12. (1936) 66 C.C.C. 206.
13. R . ▼. Ouellette (1931) 55 C.C.C. 389; R. v. Constable (1936) 
66 C.C.C. 206.
14. R. v. Royer (1952) 104 C.C.C. 189.
15. R. v. Pollock (1947) 90 C.C.C. 171; R. v. Desbiens (1951) 103 
C.C.C. 36.
16. R. v. Donald (1954) 108 C.C.C. 173; R. v. Denny (1956) 22 C.R. 
387
17. R. v. Cox [1949] 1 D.L.R. 524.
18. (1951) 15 Geo. VI, c. 49, s. 14(2).
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innocence on a charge under this section. In R. v. McKenzie,19 
Sissons, C. J. said:
. . . .  the offence is not that the driving was impaired by 
alcohol but that the accused drove while his ability to 
drive was impaired.
If the person who is in care or control of the motor vehicle is 
found on examination to be impaired in his ability to drive, 
there is no need to prove that he actually drove erratically or 
dangerously.20
To convict a person of driving or having care or control of a 
motor vehicle while his ability to drive is impaired there must be 
more than a slight variation from the way he would normally act. 
The evidence must be reasonably conclusive that the driver is 
under the influence of alcohol with consequent impairment of 
faculties and therefore that his ability to drive is impaired.21
Influence of Drugs
Few cases have dealt with the offences of driving or having 
care or control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of a 
narcotic drug or impaired by a drug. It should be noted that 
section 222 of the Code makes it an offence to be driving or in 
care or control while under the influence of a narcotic drug. 
Section 223, however, deals with all drugs, not only narcotics.
An English case of interest is Armstrong v. Clark.22 Here 
the accused was found in his car in a semi-oomatose state as a 
result of the overaction of an injection of insulin. It was held 
that he must be convicted. As Lord Goddard, C. J. said:
. . . .  this section was designed for the protection of the
Eublic, and if a person happens to be in a condition of ealth that renders him subject to comas or take rem e­
dies which may send him into a coma, the answer is that 
he must not drive, because he is a danger to the rest of 
Her M ajesty’s subjects.23
In R. v. Pringle and Flinn,24 the accused was impaired by 
the combined effects of alcohol and drugs. It was submitted by 
counsel that section 223 creates two offences, namely, driving
19. (1955) 20 C.R. 412, at p. 412.
20. Hurley v. Taylor (1953) 107 C.C.C. 220; Beals v. R. (1957) 
117 C.C.C. 22.
21. R. v. McKenzie (1955) 20 C.R. 412.
22. (1957) 41 C.A.R. 56.
23. Ibid., at p. 60.
24. (1955) 113 C.C.C. 35.
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with ability impaired by alcohol, and driving with ability im­
paired by a drug, and that there should be no conviction if the 
impairment was the result of both. Clearihue, Co. Ct. J. stated:
. . . .  I am of the opinion that s. 223 of the Code as far 
as alcohol or a drug is concerned provides for one offence 
only. The offence is that of driving a m otor vehicle 
whilst the ability of the driver to drive a motor vehicle 
is impaired. It may be impaired by alcohol or a drug.
But these are particulars of the offence only.-5
Evidence of Intoxication or Impairment
In determining if the accused was intoxicated or impaired, 
evidence describing the accused’s actions, appearance, language 
and general conduct is admissible.26 In arriving at a decision a 
judge or jury must apply to the evidence their knowledge as 
ordinary citizens and their judgment and experience.27 Great 
care must be taken not to jump to a conclusion. Thus the fact 
that a man has been drinking and is driving recklessly is not 
prima facie evidence of driving while intoxicated. Again, the 
evidence of a reckless or negligent act, when combined with 
drink, is not conclusive evidence as sober people frequently drive 
in a reckless or negligent manner.28
Before 1951 Canadian courts had been reluctant to receive 
the results of blood, breathalizer and other chemical tests as 
evidence.29 In that year the predecessors of subsections (3) and 
(4) of section 224 were enacted. These provide in effect that a 
person need not give a sample of bodily substance but once it is 
obtained it may be used in evidence.30 It must be noted that 
the result of a chemical test is not itself conclusive proof of 
intoxication or impairment.31 In Federal Insurance Co. v. Mat­
thews,32 it was held that the result of any mechanical test of 
alcoholic blood content is merely corroborative of other evidence 
leading to a conclusion whether a man is sober or not. In order
25. Ibid., at p. 37; followed in: R. ▼. Bennett (1959) 126 C.C.C. 366.
26. R. v. Pollock (1947) 90 C.C.C. 171.
27. R. v. McCauley (1949) 96 C.C.C. 355
28. Giddings v. R. (1947) 89 C.C.C. 346; R. v. Constable (1936) 
66 C.C.C. 206
29. Popple, Canadian Criminal Evidence, 2nd. ed. (1954), p. 98; 
Earnshaw v. General Insurance Co. (1943) 80 C.C.C. 35.
30. Section 224 with the relevant subsections are set out at p.
31. R. ▼. Osirowski (1958) 122 C.C.C. 196; R. v. Lord [1958] O.R. 
193.
32. (1956) 18 W.W.R. 193.
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to convict there should be tangible physical evidence of driving 
impairment in the form of one or more of the usual obvious in­
dications of impairment.33
Considerable discussion34 has centered around two problems: 
the accuracy of chemical tests in measuring blood-alcohol con­
centration; and the amount of alcohol needed to impair or in­
toxicate. As to the first problem, facilities available in police 
stations are often unsatisfactory for administering chemical tests 
and police officers often lack skill in examination. As regards 
the second, it takes considerably more alcohol to impair one 
man’s driving ability and judgment than it would to impair an­
other’s. The difference arises from many variables including 
body conditions, food consumed before drinking and the size erf 
the man. Again, there is a wide measure of disagreement among 
doctors as to the findings on an examination of the driver and 
the conclusion to be drawn from these findings. In many foreign 
countries, blood-alcohol concentrations are used as a basis for 
a conviotion. The great variances in the percentages adopted 
leads one to doubt the wisdom of such measures. For example, 
in Ireland a 50 mg./lOO ml. ratio is necessary for conviction 
while in Germany 150 mg./lOO ml. is sufficient. No consider­
ation is given to variances in human capacity and size.
Motor Vehicle
Under both section 222 and section 223, it is necessary to 
prove that the vehicle involved in the offence was a motor ve­
hicle. Before the introduction of a definition into the Criminal 
Code in 1953, different opinions had been expressed in Canadian 
courts as to what constitutes a motor vehicle within the meaning 
of the sections. In R. v. Higgins,35 Orde, J. A. stated:
I think this section must be confined to a motor vehicle 
which is either being driven or is capable of being driven  
and cannot apply to a car out of commission and unable 
to be operated under its own power.
However, in later cases a vehicle, even though inoperative at the 
time owing to a mechanical failure, lack of gas or some other
33. R. ▼. Marks (1952) 15 C.R. 47; R. ▼. Royer (1953) 104 C.C.C. 189.
34. See Stuart Ryan, Q.C., “Chemical Tests to Prove Impairment 
by Alcohol” (1959-60) 2 Crim. L.Q., p. 41; Edson L. Haines, 
Q.C., “Let’s Impose a Lim it on Drinking and Driving” (1960-1) 
3 Crim. L.Q., p. 60; “The Drinking Driver and the Law ” [I960] 
Crim. L.R., p. 152.
35. (1928) 50 C.C.C. 381; see alsoR. v. Young [1939] 2 D.L.R. 62; 
R. ▼. Conlin (1948) 92 C.C.C. 58; R. v. Williamson (1950) 98 
C.C.C. 179; R. ▼. Broughlon (1951) 100 C.C.C. 157; R. ▼. Cook 
(1956) 24 C.R. 313.
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reason, was still found to be a motor vehicle for the purpose of 
the sections. This view was expressed in R. v. Tait36 by McPher­
son, C.J.M. as follows:
I am not prepared to adopt the proposition that if 
anything stops a motor car from operating, such as a 
disconnected wire, defects in ignition or loss of air from  
tires, it ceases to be an automobile and the person re ­
sponsible for its operation is not relieved from all or any 
responsibility.
The term is now defined by section 2(25) of the Criminal 
Code which reads as follows:
“Motor vehicle” means a vehicle that is drawn, pro­
pelled or driven by any means other than muscular 
power, but does not include a vehicle of a railw ay that 
operates on rails.
In R. v. Rye,37 it was held that the decisions previous to this 
enactment can no longer be considered to be authorities respect­
ing the definition of a “motor vehicle”, but the view in R. v. Tait 
seems to express the law under the definition. In the Rye case 
the accused’s vehicle was stuck in the snow and could not be 
moved under its own power. MacDonald, J. A. stated:
It is quite im material to the commission of the offence 
that the car was stuck in the snow.
The fact that a vehicle has run out of gas and is being propelled 
by a truck to a sendee station does not make it any the less a 
motor vehicle.38 The reason for this is explained in R. v. Henry,39 
which was decided before the definition. Prendergast, C.J.M. 
stated:
. . . .  the steering appliances are integral parts of an auto 
car as such, which differentiate it both in make-up and 
sharp action, from ordinary vehicles. I would also say 
that even if its course were only deflected by a foot or 
two, injudicious control of it, by causing the car to dart 
trom  the right to the left, would be a danger to other 
cars and foot-passengers . . . .-*0
It had been doubtful before the introduction of section 2(25) 
whether a tractor was within the definition of a motor vehicle
36. (1951) 101 C.C.C. 337; followed: R. v. McGarvie (1959) 20 C.R. 
286.
37. (1958) 27 C.R. 153.
38. R. v. Walker (1954) 18 C.R. 285.
39. (1934) 61 C.C.C. 207; followed: R. v. Boivin (1950) 96 C.C.C.
234.
40. Ibid., at pp. 209-10
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for the purposes of the section. It is now clear that it comes 
within the definition.41
Driving and Care or Control
In addition to establishing that the vehicle concerned is a 
motor vehicle and that the accused was impaired or intoxicated, 
it must also be established that the accused was either “driving” 
or had “care or control” of the motor vehicle. “Driving” and 
“care or control” form two separate offences. Therefore, an 
information that charges in one count that the accused “did drive 
and have the care or control of a motor vehicle while his ability 
to drive was impaired” charges two offences and is void for 
duplicity.42
Proof of driving has not given rise to many problems. One 
interesting situation arose in R. v. Jacobs.43 Here a car owner 
bringing his vehicle to a stop momentarily on the wrong side of 
the road with the lights on and the engine running was held to 
be driving in bringing the automobile to a stop as much as in 
accelerating or steering it.
The ingredients of “care or control” have provided the courts 
with mudh greater difficulties. One problem is whether the 
words “care or control” create one offence only or whether the 
words “care” and “control” should be treated as creating two 
separate offences. It has been held to be one offence. ‘ Care” 
is broad enough to include “control”, and conversely it would 
seem that “control” involves “care”.44 What is probably meant 
by care or control is an actual physical control which can be 
converted into conduct creating actual damage.45
In order to lighten the difficulties of the Crown in proving 
care or control, a section (now section 224(2)) was addea to the 
Criminal Code. By this section, where a person occupies the 
seat ordinarily occupied by the driver of a motor vehicle be shall 
be deemed to have the care or control of the vehicle unless he 
establishes that he did not enter or mount the vehicle for the
41. R. v. Swarychewski (1957) 22 W.W.R. 91; the following earlier 
cases agreed: R. ▼. Gaiewski (1951) 102 C.C.C. 115; but R. v. 
Owens (1950) 98 C.C.C. 279; R. v. Urushott (1951) 99 C.C.C. 
320 disagreed
42. R. v. Phillips (1958) 122 C.C.C. 181.
43. (1955) 16 W.W.R. 126.
44. R. v. Coffill (1950) 100 C.C.C. 82; see also R. v. Thomson (1941)
75 C.C.C. 141
45. R. v. Butler [1939] 4 D.L.R. 592.
U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL 53
purpose of setting it in motion.46 Several cases have been de­
cided under the section. In R. v. MacKay47 a person who while 
intoxicated occupied the driver’s seat of a motor vehicle which 
was off the highway and parked in a private driveway was held 
guilty of an offence under section 285(4) (now s. 222) because he 
did not discharge the onus of establishing that he aid not enter 
the vehicle for the purpose of setting it in motion. In R. v. Mac- 
Lellan,48 the accused was found sleeping behind the wheel of a 
parked vehicle beside the road and was visibly impaired. Hughes, 
J. stated:
The intention of the accused as to putting his motor ve­
hicle in motion is only m aterial at the time of entering 
or mounting it . . .  . The accused failed to rebut the pre­
sumption of care or control apparently for the reason  
that when he entered his vehicle he did set it in motion.49
It is immaterial that the accused at the time he stopped the car 
prior to apprehension did no intend to set the vehicle in motion 
again.
Two interesting dicta appear in civil cases where a person 
was not sitting in the drivers seat in the motor vehicle. In 
McKenzie v. Western Assurance Co.,50 the question arose whe­
ther the plaintiff could collect on an insurance policy which pro­
hibited him from driving while intoxicated. On the occasion of 
the accident he became intoxicated and engaged an experienced 
driver, but during the trip he slipped off the seat, grabbed the 
steering wheel and caused the collision. Spence, J. stated:
Surely there is an inference that the Derson who 
occupies a seat other than that ordinarily occupied by 
the person driving should not bo deemed to have control 
of the vehicle for the purpose of the prohibition in the 
Criminal Code, and surely the inference from the latter 
words is that it is only the person who enters the vehicle 
for the purpose of setting it in motion who can be held 
to have committed the offence.5*
In Joubert v. Toronto General Trusts,62 the plaintiff was driving 
with the car driver, whom he knew to be intoxicated, and was 
drinking with him. Adamson, C.J.M. stated:
46. See: R. v. McLean (1953) 107 C.C.C. 32; R. ▼. Gilchrist (1954) 
109 C.C.C. 348; R. v. Walker (1954) 110 C.C.C. 207.
47. (1949) 95 C.C.C. 97.
48. R. ▼. MacLellan (1959) 30 C.R. 38; disapproving R. ▼. Perigny 
(1957) 27 C.R. 1; see also R. v. McLeod [1948] 3 D.L.R. 613.
49. Ibid., at p. 42.
50. [1955] 1 D.L.R. 271.
51. Ibid., at p. 279.
52. (1955) 15 W.W.R. 654.
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By driving with him, and especially drinking with him 
in the car wften driving and when he (the driver) was 
already intoxicated, the plaintiff made himself a party  
to the crime of driving while intoxicated.53
Mens Rea
At one time the question whether mens rea was necessary 
to constitute the offence of driving or having care or control 
while intoxicated or impaired gave rise to a difference of opinion. 
The view accepted in some courts was that a person is able to 
haive the control of a motor vehicle notwithstanding that he is 
incapable by reason of intoxication of forming an intention to 
drive the car. Thus Chisolm, C.J.N.S. in R. v. Crowe54 made it 
clear that the purpose of the section being the protection of the 
public, the legislature intended an absolute prohibition. Simi­
larly, in R. v. Hyatt,66 the accused was found slumped behind 
the wheel of a car with the ignition turned on. He claimed that 
he had entered the car with the intention of sleeping, not driving; 
but mens rea was held not to be an ingredient of the offence and 
the accused was convicted.
Other courts took the opposite view. In R. v. Thomson,66 
the defendant entered a motor vehicle and sat in the front seat, 
but his actions demonstrated that he had no intention of driving. 
Baxter, C.J.N.B. held that until Parliament says definitely that 
mens rea is to be excluded from the section, the courts should 
presume it. Again in R. v. Forbes,57 it was held that a person 
incapable of functioning physically or mentally was incapable 
of putting the vehicle in motion.
This difference of opinion seems to have been brought to an 
end by what is now section 224(2) of the Criminal Code. As 
previously seen, this section shifts the onus onto the accused to 
show that he did not enter the vehicle with the intention of 
setting it in motion when he is found in the drivers seat in an 
impaired or intoxicated condition. In R. v. Luhtala58 it was 
held that the section reintroduces the factor of intention. The 
decision was followed in R. v. Gilchrist;59 there the charge against 
the accused was dismissed because he was able to establish his 
lack of intention to set the vehicle in motion.
53. Ibid., at p. 659.
54. (1941) 76 C.C.C. 170.
55. (1945) 84 C.C.C. 253.
56. (1940) 75 C.C.C. 141.
57. (1943) 79 C.C.C. 116.
58. (1956) 23 C.R. 240.
59. (1954) 109 C.C.C. 348.
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At first sight R. v. Wilson60 seems to run against this trend. 
There the accused was found slumped over the steering wheel 
in an intoxicated condition. He was unable to discharge the 
onus that he had not entered the motor vehicle for the purpose 
of setting it in motion. Aylen, J. said:
It seems to me that the present s. 224(2) of the Code 
means in effect that mens rea no longer comes in to a 
proper decision for an offence under s. 222. . . .01
A close examination of the case reveals, however, that Aylen, J. 
did not mean that mens rea was not an essential ingredient of 
the offence as was widely accepted before the introduction of 
section 224(2). He seems simply to hatve meant that the onus of 
proving guilty intent is not on the Crown; it is for the accused 
to show lack of intent. As stated in section 224(2) the accused 
must establish that he did not intend to set the vehicle in mo­
tion.62
60. (1957) 117 C.C.C. 105.
61. Ibid., at p. 108.
62. R. ▼. Perigny (1957) 27 C.R. 1; R. ▼. MacLellan (1959) 30 C.R.
38.
